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Abstract
We study the optimal management of an aggregated overfunded
pension plan of defined benefit type as a two-player noncooperative
differential game. The model’s key fact is to consider the fund surplus
as a strategic variable that makes the pension plan more attractive both
for current and future participants. We let the worker participants to
act collectively as a single player that claims a share of the surplus,
and let the sponsoring firm act as the player that cares about the
investment of the surplus fund assets. The union’s objective is to
maximize the expected discounted utility of the extra benefits claimed.
We solve this asymmetric game under two different assumptions on the
preferences of the firm: in the first scenario, the firm aims to maximize
expected discounted utility derived from fund surplus; while in the
second scenario, the firm cares about minimizing the probability that
the fund surplus reaches very low values.
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1 Introduction
In defined benefit pension plans, a firm provides benefits to workers when
they retire. Benefits have been fixed in advance, and it is the sole respons-
ability of the firm to honor this liability. To this end, a pension plan is de-
signed by using actuarial valuation, which calculates suitable contributions
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to the fund to meet the promised benefit. Actuarial valuation takes into
account such variables as retirement age, employee’s life expectancy, mean
salary increase, annual retirement benefit amount, worker mobility, the pos-
sible evolution of interest rates and stock market performance, among others.
Besides contributions made by the employer and possible contributions by
the employee, the employer decides how to invest the pension fund’s assets.
Pension plans that have more (less) liabilities than assets are known as
underfunded (overfunded). That a pension plan becomes under- or over-
funded is a dynamic process which depends to a great extent on crashes and
booms in the stock market. Whereas, in the underfunded case, it is natural
to think that the efforts of the employer should be aimed at minimizing the
gap between fund assets and liability, it is not clear what to recommend in
the overfunded region. Legislation forbids the distribution of any surplus of
the pension plan to shareholders, being devoted to current and future re-
tirees. The firm may simply keep this excess amount in the fund’s account,
without any other motive than to accumulate assets, or the firm may act
more strategically, designing policies that provide, in addtion of safety, addi-
tional incentives to future participants to join the pension plan by providing
extra rewards to both participants and retirees. On the other hand, workers
would surely like to play an active role in taking decisions on how to use
the fund surplus. It could be used to lessen the agreed contributions, or to
provide an extra benefit—it makes no sense to simply continue accumulating
assets to the pension plan if they are not going to be distributed to partic-
ipants. Moreover, fund assets are subject to taxation. The larger the fund
size, the larger the tax payments. Instead of using the fund surplus to pay
taxes, agents may wonder why they should not allocate part of this surplus
among the participants. As said above, this would make it more attractive
for future workers to be hired by the firm and, consequently, enter into the
pension plan, making it a stronger financial instrument into the financial
market.
The main question we address in this paper is how to manage the sur-
plus when the pension fund is overfunded. In more detail, the objective
of the firm to minimize the (squared) difference between fund assets and
actuarial liability is fine when the fund is underfunded, but it is not com-
pletely satisfactory in the overfunded case, as it refrains from using invest-
ment opportunities that may provide high expected returns. To consider
quadratic loss functions is common in the literature on the optimal manage-
ment of defined benefit pension plans; see e.g. Haberman and Sung (1994),
Chang (1999), Cairns (2000), Haberman, Butt and Megaloudi (2000), Josa-
Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2001, 2004), Chang et al. (2002, 2003),
Delong et al (2008), Xu et al (2007) and Hainaut (2014), among others.
Some extensions include stochastic interest rates, as in Huang and Cairns
(2006), Josa-Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2010) or Hainaut and Deel-
stra (2011), or the consideration of jumps in the evolution of benefits and/or
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risky assets, as in Josa-Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2012) or Le Cour-
tois and Menoncin (2015) (the latter in defined contribution pension plans).
When the fund is overfunded, the sponsor could face slightly more risky
investments to try to raise fund assets1. Now, if the firm takes more risky
investment decisions, then the participants should be compensated in some
way for the exposure of the pension plan to a higher risk of becoming un-
derfunded. We suppose that this compensation is negotiated dynamically
between the firm and the representatives of the workers. The compensa-
tion consists of a claim on the fund surplus, which can be seen as an excess
pension benefit that is added to the agreed benefits at the moment of re-
tirement. No claim of excess benefits is allowed when the pension plan is
underfunded. We model this conflict between the firm and the union as a
non-zero sum dynamic game. The natural framework is a noncooperative
interaction, but we also allow for commitment between players and study
cooperative solutions. The main objective of the firms is to maintain fund
assets at safe levels so as to be able to pay benefits; however, as this is en-
tirely the employer’s responsability, workers may be interested in claiming
a share of the excess fund assets in the form of a premium benefit. Never-
theless, there is nothing to withdraw when there is no surplus, so workers
have to be careful with their demands in order not to drive the fund into
the underfunded region.
To our knowledge, the models that have appeared in the literature of the
dynamic management of defined benefit pension plans consider only one de-
cision agent, the sponsor of the plan. The recent paper by Guan and Liang
(2016), considers a game between the managers of two defined contribution
pension funds, under inflation risks. This game is quite different from the
game we propose here. First, our game is for defined benefit plans and sec-
ond, the conflict arises because the players have different views on how the
surplus fund assets should be shared. In the former defined contribution
plan game, the conflict comes from two different managers looking for in-
vestment opportunities, trying to maximize the expected utility on wealth,
by acting non cooperatively. Hence, both players have the same instrument
at hand, that is investment. However, in our game, whereas the firm chooses
portfolios, the union decides, roughly speaking, about benefits. It is as if
in the classical Merton model the consumption/investment decisions were
decentralized, with one agent choosing investment and the other choosing
consumption (benefits). Hence, the conflict is inside the pension plan it-
self, and it determines the investment and benefits outcomes of the plan. In
1This is because, as the fund’s assets grow, it could be possible to diminish the planned
contributions in the actuarial computations. For instance, if the sponsor is using a spread
method of funding, that is, the contribution C equals NC + j(AL− F ), where NC is the
normal cost, AL is the liability, F fund’s assets, and j > 0 is the velocity of adjustment of
the contribution to the normal cost, then contributions are below the normal cost in the
overfunded region.
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Guan and Liang (2016), as well as in the rest of references below dealing with
stochastic portfolio games, the interaction is between two different pension
plans (or investment managers, depending of the context). The structure
of the game is also different from other portfolio games that have appeared
in the literature. It is worth mentioning Browne (2000), where a variety of
games that model different preferences of the agents are considered: utility
maximization, ruin probability minimization and minimizing/maximizing-
expected-time to reach an objective. The game that we propose in this
paper has elements in common with Leong and Huang (2010), which stud-
ies an stochastic version of the differential game of capitalism in Lancaster
(1973), where the players are the government, that maximizes a vote func-
tion, and a representative firm, that maximizes a flow of dividend payments
for the shareholders, or with Cabo and Garc´ıa-Gonza´lez (2014). where the
authors consider, in a deterministic setting, a dynamic game of public pen-
sion provision between the government and a representative employee, in
order to determine the optimal retirement age. The players have quadratic
preferences.
We find that players with CRRA utilities use, in equilibrium, linear
strategies, proportional to the fund surplus, in such a way that the fund
surplus never becomes null with positive probability in finite time. Moreover,
when the players have the same relative risk aversion coefficient, the Nash
equilibrium is Pareto optimal. Also, we show that if the aim of the firm
is to minimize the probability of ruin, this objective is attained for a firm
that wishes to maximize the utility obtained from the fund’s assets surplus
for a specific relative risk aversion coefficient. Overall, what we do is to
design a scheme of how the fund could be split between the participants
and the firm when the pension plan is overfunded. This division is not
based on commitment, and no player has an incentive to deviate from this
recommendation, even at any intermediate stage of the interaction.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2. we define the elements
of the pension plan and the financial market. We let the worker participants
to act collectively as a single player that claims a share of the surplus, and
let the sponsoring firm act as the player that cares about the investment of
the surplus fund assets. The union’s objective is to maximize the expected
discounted utility of the extra benefits claimed. We solve the game under
two different assumptions on the preferences of the firm: while in the first
scenario, the firm aims to maximize expected discounted utility derived from
fund surplus; in the second scenario, considered in Section 3, the firm cares
about minimizing the probability that the fund surplus should reach very
low values. Finally, Section 4 establishes some further research directions.
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2 The pension game
In this section, we set the elements of the maiden game: the financial market,
the fund surplus evolution and the payoffs and strategies of the players. After
solving for the Nash equilibrium, we show that it is also a Pareto outcome
when the players have the same discount factors and the same risk aversion
coefficients.
2.1 Financial market and fund surplus evolution
The financial market is that introduced by Merton (1971). Consider a
probability space (Ω,F ,P), where P is a probability measure on Ω and
F = {Ft}t≥0 is a complete and right continuous filtration generated by
the n–dimensional standard Brownian motion w = (w1, . . . , wn)
>, that is,
Ft = σ {w1(s), . . . , wn(s); 0 ≤ s ≤ t}.
As in Merton’s model, the investor may trade between a riskless bond
S0 and n risky assets S1, . . . , Sn, which are geometric Brownian motions.
dS0(t) = rS0(t)dt, S0(0) = 1, (1)
dSi(t) = Si(t)
(
bidt+
n∑
j=1
σijdwj(t)
)
, Si(0) = si, i = 1, . . . , n. (2)
The constant r > 0 denotes the short risk–free rate of interest, bi > 0
the mean rate of return of the risky asset Si, and σij > 0 the volatility
coefficients. It is assumed that bi > r, for each i = 1, ..., n, so the investor
has incentives to invest with risk. The matrix (σij) is denoted by σ and
the Sharpe ratio or market price of risk for this portfolio, σ−1(b− r1), by θ,
where b = (b1, . . . , bn)
> and 1 is a (column) vector of ones. The market is
complete, that is, the symmetric matrix Σ = σσ> is positive definite.
In our framework, the investor is the firm sponsoring the pension plan,
who at time t = 0 possesses an initial endowment of fund reserves above the
liability. We denote by X(t) the surplus at time t. At the initial time, this
excess value is X(0) = x > 0. Whenever X is positive, the union claims a
share of X in the form of extra benefits. No claim is admitted if X becomes
zero or negative. The sponsoring firm forms portfolios dynamically with
the bond and the risky assets, trading among them. Let pii be the chosen
amount of surplus to be invested in the asset i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, and let pi0 be
the amount invested in the bond; clearly pi0 = X −
∑n
i=1 pii. We denote
by P the extra benefits claimed by the union. Under the trading strategy
pi = (pi1, . . . , pin)
> and benefits P , X follows the dynamics
dX(t) =
n∑
i=1
pii(t)
dSi(t)
Si(t)
+
(
X −
n∑
i=1
pii(t)
)dS0(t)
S0(t)
− P (t)dt, (3)
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or, after substituting (1) and (2) in (3)
dX(t) =
(
rX(t) + pi>(t)(b− r1)− P (t)
)
dt+ pi>(t)σ dw(t), (4)
which, toghether with the initial condition X(0) = x, drives the asset’s
surplus fund evolution.
Now we define the class of admissible strategies of the union, AU , and
the firm, AF . The union chooses benefits and the firm chooses the portfolio.
Investment and benefit strategies are both Markovian and stationary, that
is, they depend only on the state variable x and are independent of time,
pi ≡ pi(x), P ≡ P (x). As said above, benefits cannot take on negative values,
but they are null if the pension plan gets underfunded, thus P (x) ≥ 0 for
any x > 0 and P (x) = 0 if x ≤ 0. We also assume that both processes
{pi(X(t)) : t ≥ 0} and {P (X(t)) : t ≥ 0} are adapted to the filtration
{Ft}t≥0 and Ft–measurable. Moreover, (P, pi) satisfies the integrability
condition
E
∫ T
0
P (t)dt+ E
∫ T
0
pi>(t)pi(t)dt <∞, ∀T > 0. (5)
Then, given X(0) = x, (4) admits a unique strong solution. Note that in
(5) we are identifying pi(t) with pi(X(t)), as well as P (t) with P (X(t)), to
shorten notation.
2.2 Players’ Payoffs
Let the strategic profile (P, pi) ∈ AU × AM . Given pi, the union chooses P
that maximizes the payoff
JU (x;P, pi) = Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αtu(P (t))dt, (6)
where u is a utility function of benefits and α > 0 is the time preference of
the union.
In the same way, given P , the firm seeks pi to maximize the payoff
JF (x;P, pi) = Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−βtv(X(t))dt, (7)
where v is a utility function of the fund surplus and β > 0 is the time
preference of the firm.
To obtain explicit solutions, we focus on CRRA utility functions2:
u(P ) =
P 1−γ
1− γ , 0 < γ < 1,
v(X) =
X1−δ
1− δ , 0 < δ < 1.
2When γ = 1 and δ = 1, the utility functions are type: u(P ) = lnP, v(X) = lnX.
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We assume that the risk aversion indexes γ, δ are in (0, 1), so the utility
functions are both strictly concave.
2.3 Nash equilibrium strategies
In a dynamic noncooperative setting, the relevant solution concept is the
Markov perfect Nash equilibrium. An MPNE of the pension game is a pair
of admissible strategies (P ∗, pi∗) ∈ AU × AF such that, for any (P, pi) ∈
AU ×AF , for any x > 0
JU (x;P
∗, pi∗) ≥ JU (x;P, pi∗),
JF (x;P
∗, pi∗) ≥ JF (x;P ∗, pi).
Let VU and VF be the value function of the union and the firm respectively,
that is
VU (x) = JU (x;P
∗, pi∗),
VF (x) = JF (x;P
∗, pi∗).
In the next proposition, we state the form of the MPNE of the pension
game.
Proposition 2.1 Assume that the parameters of the game are such that the
constants A,B given in (8) and (9) below are both positive. Then the value
function of the union and the firm in the Nash pension game (4), (6), (7)
are
VU (x) = A
x1−γ
1− γ ,
VF (x) = B
x1−δ
1− δ ,
respectively, where
A =
(
α
γ
− 1− γ
γ
(
r +
(
1
δ
− γ
2δ2
)
θ>θ
))−γ
, (8)
B =
1
1− δ
(
β
1− δ +
α− r
γ
+
(
1− γ
2δ2
− 1− γ
γδ
− 1
2δ
)
θ>θ
)−1
. (9)
The MPNE (P ∗, pi∗) is given by
P ∗(x) = A−1/γx, (10)
pi∗(x) =
1
δ
Σ−1(b− r1)x (11)
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and the equilibrium fund surplus is a geometric Brownian motion process,
dX∗(t) = X∗(t)
(
r +
1
δ
θ>θ −A−1/γ
)
dt+X∗(t)
1
δ
θ> dw(t), (12)
thus X∗ > 0.
Proof. The Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman system of PDEs of the Nash pen-
sion game is
αVU (x) = max
P
{
P 1−γ
1− γ +
(
rx+ pi>(b− r1)− P )V ′U (x)}+ 12pi>ΣpiV ′′U (x),
βVF (x) = max
pi
{
x1−δ
1− δ +
(
rx+ pi>(b− r1)− P )V ′F (x) + 12pi>ΣpiV ′′F (x)
}
.
From the optimality conditions we have
P−γ − V ′U (x) = 0⇒ P = (V ′U (x))−1/γ , (13)
(b− r1)V ′F (x) + σσ>piV ′′F (x) = 0⇒ pi = −Σ−1(b− r1)
V ′F (x)
V ′′F (x)
. (14)
Plugging these expressions into the HJB system, and after some simplifica-
tions, we have
αVU (x) =
γ
1− γ (V
′
U (x))
1−1/γ + rxV ′U (x)− θ>θ
V ′F (x)
V ′′F (x)
V ′U (x) +
1
2
θ>θ
(
V ′F (x)
V ′′F (x)
)2
V ′′U (x),
βVF (x) =
x1−δ
1− δ + rxV
′
F (x)−
1
2
θ>θ
(V ′F (x))
2
V ′′F (x)
− (V ′U (x))−1/γV ′F (x).
(15)
Let us try solutions VU (x) = A
x1−γ
1−γ , VF (x) = B
x1−δ
1−δ , where A,B > 0
are suitable constants that are determined with the help of the equations
(15). After substituting the guessed value functions, we obtain homogeneous
expressions in the powers x1−γ and x1−δ, respectively. Thus, the following
two algebraic equations for A, B have to be fulfilled
α
1− γA =
γ
1− γA
1−1/γ + rA+
1
δ
θ>θA− γ
2δ2
θ>θA,
β
1− δB =
1
1− δ + rB +
1
2δ
θ>θB −A−1/γB.
Solving for A and B to get (8) and (9) is straightforward.
Now, the equilibrium candidate (10) and (11) is obtained from the opti-
mality conditions (13) and (14), once VU and VF have been substituted. To
see that the pair (P ∗, pi∗) is indeed an MPNE, note that V ′′F < 0, because
B > 0, thus pi∗ is a true maximizer of the HJB equation for the firm—it was
already clear that P ∗ was a maximizer of the HJB equation of the union—.
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Upon substitution of (P ∗, pi∗) into the SDE (4), we get (12), thus (P ∗, pi∗)
is clearly an admissible pair of strategies. In fact, the solution of (12) is
X∗(t) = x exp
((
r +
1
δ
θ>θ −A−1/γ − 1
2δ2
θ>θ
)
t+
1
δ
θ>
∫ t
0
w(s)ds
)
,
hence X∗(t) > 0. Finally, we prove that the transversality condition holds,
that is
lim
t→∞ e
−αtExVU (X∗(t)) = lim
t→∞ e
−βtExVF (X∗(t)) = 0. (16)
See, for instance, Herna´ndez-Lerma (1994), Section 7, or Theorem 8.5 of
Dockner et al (2000). By Arnold (1974), p. 139, for any real number a,
Ex(X∗(t))a = xa exp
{
a
(
r +
1
δ
θ>θ −A−1/γ − 1
2δ2
θ>θ
)
t+
a2
2δ2
θ>θt
}
.
After replacing a by 1− γ and then for 1− δ, we see that (16) holds if and
only if
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
δ
θ>θ −A−1/γ − 1
2
γ
δ2
θ>θ
)
< α,
(1− δ)
(
r −A−1/γ + 1
2δ
θ>θ
)
< β.
These two conditions are equivalent to the nonnegativity of the constants
A > 0 and B > 0 respectively, which is assumed in the proposition. 
Remark 2.1 (Study of the signs of A and B) Positivity of the constants
A and B are crucial in the above result. Note that by no means do A and/or
B negative imply that a Nash equilibrium does not exist, only that it is not in
linear strategies. To explore if the game admits a Nash equilibrium out of the
conditions imposed in the result above is beyond the scope of this paper. The
constant A defined in (8) is positive if and only if α > (1− γ)(r+ f(δ)θ>θ),
where f(δ) = 1δ − γ2δ2 . It is clear that the more risk averse the players are
(i.e., δ, γ → 1, logarithmic utility), the easier it is for the inequality to be
fulfilled. On the contrary, for players showing very small risk aversion (i.e.,
δ, γ → 0), the inequality may require high discount factors of the union.
Analytically, this is because f attains its maximum value at δ = γ, hence
players having the same risk aversion is the most unfavorable case, and in
this case α should be greater than (1− γ)(r+ 12γ θ>θ). Obviously, small val-
ues of γ would need large values of the discount factor α. Analogously, the
constant B is positive if and only if β > 1−δγ (r − α + (1 − γ)g(δ)), where
g(δ) = 1δ − γ2δ2 + γ2δ(1−γ) . We have a completely similar situation. The
inequality is more likely to be fulfilled as the risk aversion is higher. Now,
players close to being risk neutral would imply high discount factors β of the
firm.
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Remark 2.2 The previous proposition remains true for logarithmic utility
functions u(P ) = lnP and v(X) = lnX. The value functions of the union
and the firm are
VU (x) =
1
α
lnx+
1
α2
(
r +
θ>θ
2
)
+
1
α
(lnα− 1),
VF (x) =
1
β
lnx+
1
β2
(
r +
θ>θ
2
)
− α
β2
,
respectively, the MPNE is given by P ∗(x) = αx, pi∗(x) = Σ−1(b− r1)x, and
the equilibrium fund surplus is the geometric Brownian motion process,
dX∗(t) =
(
r + θ>θ − α
)
X∗(t)dt+ θ>X∗(t) dw(t).
Note that the transversality condition is easily fulfilled because Ex lnX∗(t) =
lnx+
(
r + θ>θ − α) t.
2.3.1 Comparative statics of Nash equilibrium
Both equilibrium strategies found in Proposition 2.1 are linear in fund sur-
plus. The firm investment strategy, pi∗(x) = 1δΣ
−1(b − r1)x, is also the
optimal investment strategy for the Merton model of maximizing the util-
ity from consumption with a CRRA utility function (of course, the original
Merton model is not a two-player game). Note that, in the pension game,
maximization is performed with respect to fund surplus (or wealth). The
expression of pi∗ depends on the firm risk aversion coefficient, δ, the excess
mean returns of the risky assets with respect to the bond, (b− r1), and on
the inverse of the matrix Σ, which collects the volatility coefficients of the
risky assets. For δ = 1, i.e., when the utility is logarithmic, (1990, Ch. 6)
demonstrates that pi∗ maximizes the discounted and expected rate at which
the fund surplus (or wealth) compounds. For this reason, it is called the
optimal-growth portfolio strategy. For the very same reason, pi∗ minimizes
the expected time to hit a higher fund (or wealth) prescribed level. Hence,
in equilibrium, the firm aims to maximize the fund growth rate, according to
the attitude towards risk shown in the firm’s preferences. This is, of course,
an objective that is aligned with the union’s preferences, as it is obvious that
the greater the growth of the fund, the greater the benefits that the workers
will claim. In fact, we will prove in Section 2.4 that, when both players have
the same risk aversion coefficient, the MPNE is Pareto efficient. Finally,
note that the investment strategy, pi∗, decreases with the risk aversion coef-
ficient of the firm, δ. On the other hand, the union’s equilibrium strategy,
P ∗(x) = A−1/γx, shows a more complicated dependence on the parameters
of the pension game. The constant A depends on the attitude towards risk
of both players, the subjective discount factor of the union of workers, and
finally, elements of the financial market that summarize the risk and return
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of the assets. Computing the derivatives of the constant of proportionality
A−1/γ = 1−γγ
(
α
1−γ − r − 1δ θ>θ + γ2δ2 θ>θ
)
is easy. We have
∂A−1/γ
∂α
=
1
γ
, (17)
∂A−1/γ
∂r
= −1− γ
γ
, (18)
∂A−1/γ
∂θ
=
(1− γ)(γ − 2δ)
δ2γ
θ>, (19)
∂A−1/γ
∂δ
=
(1− γ)(δ − γ)
δ3γ
θ>θ (δ 6= γ), (20)
∂A−1/γ
∂γ
= −γ − 2δ
2δ2γ
θ>θ − α− r
γ
(γ 6= δ). (21)
As expected, (17) shows that P ∗ increases with α, since the union cares
more about the present than about the future when the subjective discount
factor increases. Expression (18) shows a negative dependence of P ∗ with
respect to the riskless rate of return, r, since 0 < γ < 1. This is because
the larger r is, the larger the return of the portfolio, all the other elements
being constant. Hence it pays to withdraw less surplus now in order to get
a larger average return in the future, so the total expected benefit collected
will be greater. The influence of the Sharpe ratio on benefits appears in
(19) and depends on the relative size of the relative risk aversion coefficient
of the players. The benefits are increasing (decreasing) if γ > 2δ (γ < 2δ),
that is, if the risk aversion of the union is more (less) than the double of
the risk aversion of the manager. In the particular case γ = 2δ, benefits are
independent of the Sharpe ratio.
In (20), we have that benefits decrease when the risk aversion parameter
of the manager increases and the manager is more risk averse than the union,
but P ∗ increases when the union is more risk averse than the firm. The
benefits P ∗ reaches its minimum value when both union and firm have the
same risk aversion index, δ = γ, and it is P ∗(x) = 1−γγ
(
α
1−γ − r − θ
>θ
2γ
)
x.
The dependence on its own risk aversion parameter is given in (21) and
this shows many possibilities. If the discount rate α is greater than r− 1δ θ>θ,
then the benefits are decreasing with γ. This is because uncertainty makes
the union save more now to get greater surplus in the future; this behavior is
speeded up because the union cares more about the present than the future.
However, if α is not large enough, we can find regions for which benefits
increase as γ decreases. In particular, this happens for γ close to 0 (when
the union is “almost” risk neutral).
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2.3.2 Surplus and extra benefits equilibrium evolution
In order to study the expected surplus evolution, we take expectation in
(12) to obtain
ExX(t) = x exp
{(
r +
1
δ
θ>θ −A−1/γ)t} ,
that converges to∞ if r+ 1δ θ>θ > A−1/γ , that is to say, when r−α+ 1δ θ>θ >
1
2δ2
γ(1− γ)θ>θ, and converges to 0, otherwise.
From (12), we also can obtain the benefits evolution, using P ∗ = A−1/γX:
dP (t) =
(
r +
1
δ
θ>θ −A−1/γ
)
P (t)dt+
1
δ
θ>P (t) dw(t),
P (0) = A−1/γx. The expected benefits can be obtained easily, given X(0) =
x:
ExP ∗(t) = A−1/δExX(t) = A−1/δxe(r+
1
δ
θ>θ−A−1/γ)t.
2.4 Pareto equilibrium strategies
Suppose now that the players coordinate efforts to attain an efficient solu-
tion. In a two-player game, a Pareto equilibrium is a cooperative solution
of the game in which there is no possibility of improving the payoff of one
of the players without diminishing the payoff of the other player. Thus,
(P c, pic) is a Pareto equilibrium if there is no admissible (P, pi) such that
JU (x;P, pi) ≥ JU (x;P c, pic),
JF (x;P, pi) ≥ JF (x;P c, pic),
with at least one of the inequalities above being strict. It is well known that
with suitable convexity, as is the case in our framework, Pareto equilibrium
can be obtained by solving a control problem where the dynamics remains
the same as in the Nash game, but the payoff is a convex combination of
the players’ payoffs. Let us denote the weight in the convex combination
by µ. As µ takes values in the interval [0, 1], different Pareto equilibria are
obtained. Under the assumption that both players have the same negotiation
power, it is common to take µ = 1/2. We will find, however, the Pareto
equilibrium for any µ.
Hence the payoff to be maximized on the class of the admissible controls
AU ×AF is:
Jµ(x;P, pi) = Ex
∫ ∞
0
(
µe−αtu(P (t)) + (1− µ)e−βtv(X(t))
)
dt,
where u and v are utility functions of benefits and surplus, respectively, α >
0 and β > 0 are the time preference of the union and the sponsor, and µ ∈
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[0, 1] is a parameter. As well known, α 6= β leads to a problem with temporal
inconsistence. We want to avoid this complications and focus on the time-
consistent case to compare with the MPNE found in the previous section.
Moreover, an explicit solution is beyond our efforts in the asymmetric game
γ 6= δ. Again, in order to get a neat solutions easily comparable with the
outcome of the nooncooperative game, we focus on the case where the CRRA
utilities have the same relative risk aversion parameter. Thus, we assume
α = β = ρ and γ = δ, so the payoff becomes
Jµ(x;P, pi) = Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−ρt
(
µ
P (t)1−γ
1− γ + (1− µ)
X(t)1−γ
1− γ
)
dt. (22)
In order to solve the game with the dynamic programming approach (see
for instance Dockner et al (2000)), we obtain the HJB equations. Let W be
the value function,
W (x) = max
(P,pi)∈AU×AF
{
Jµ(x;P, pi) : s.t. (4)
}
.
We use the following notation to simplify the exposition. Let
m =
ρ
1− γ − r −
1
2γ
θ>θ,
n =
1− µ
1− γ ,
n˜ =
γ
1− γµ
1/γ .
Note that n, n˜ > 0.
Proposition 2.2 Assume that m > 0. Then the value function of the con-
trol problem (4), (22), is
W (x) = K
x1−γ
1− γ ,
where the constant K is the unique positive solution of(
ρ
1− γ − r −
1
2γ
θ>θ
)
K1/γ − 1− µ
1− γK
1/γ−1 − γ
1− γµ
1/γ = 0, (23)
the Markov Pareto equilibrium is
P c(x) = µ1/γK−1/γx, (24)
pic(x) =
1
γ
Σ−1(b− r1)x, (25)
and the equilibrium fund surplus evolution is given by
dX∗(t) = X∗(t)
(
r +
1
γ
θ>θ −
(
K
µ
)−1/γ )
dt+X∗(t)
1
γ
θ> dw(t). (26)
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Proof. The HJB equation is
ρW (x) = max
P,pi
{
µ
P 1−γ
1− γ + (1− µ)
x1−γ
1− γ +
(
rx+ pi>(b− r1)− P )W ′(x) + 1
2
pi>σσ>piW ′′(x)
}
.
From the optimality conditions one gets
µP−γ −W ′(x) = 0⇒ P =
(
W ′(x)
µ
)−1/γ
, (27)
(b− r1)W ′(x) + σσ>piW ′′(x)⇒ pi = −Σ−1(b− r1)W
′(x)
W ′′(x)
. (28)
After plugging these expression into the HJB equation above and collecting
some terms we lead to the PDE
ρW (x) =
γµ1/γ
1− γ (W
′(x))1−1/γ +
1− µ
1− γ x
1−γ + rxW ′(x)− 1
2
θ>θ
(W ′(x))2
W ′′(x)
.
Let us try W (x) = K x
1−γ
1−γ , with K > 0 a suitable constant. By substituting,
the HJB equation is satisfied if K is a positive solution to the algebraic
equation (23). Let us show that this equation admits a unique positive
solution K˜. Let f(K) = mK1/γ − nK1/γ−1 − n˜ be the function defined
by the left hand side of the equality. This function is continuous on [0,∞)
since 0 < γ < 1. Moreover, m,n, n˜ > 0 by assumption, hence f(0) < 0.
Computing the derivative of f with respect to K we have that f is decreasing
in [0, (1−γ)nm ] and increasing in [
(1−γ)n
m ,∞), with limK→∞ f(K) = ∞, thus
f(K) = 0 admits a unique solution. Now, we proceed to check that the
coefficient or constant of proportionality defining pc(x), which can be written
γ
1−γ (m − nK−1), is positive. This is true if and only if the zero of f , K,
is greater than nm . To see that this is indeed the case, note that f(
n
m) =
m
(
n
m
)1/γ − n ( nm)1/γ−1 − n˜ = −n˜ < 0, thus nm < K since f is negative to
the left of K and positive to the right.
Finally, we complete the proof by showing that the transversality con-
dition holds. By substituting the expression for W into the optimality con-
ditions, (27) and (28), we obtain (24) and also (25). Again, by Herna´ndez-
Lerma (1994) Section 7, or Theorem 8.5 of Dockner et al (2000), the proof
concludes when the transversality condition is checked:
lim
t→∞ e
−ρtExW (X∗(t)) = 0. (29)
As the surplus evolution with the optimal strategies is given by (26), thus,
by Arnold (1974), p. 139, for a real number a,
Ex(X∗(t))a = xa exp
{
a
(
r +
1
γ
θ>θ −
(
K
µ
)−1/γ
− 1
2
θ>θ
γ2
)
t+
a2
2
θ>θ
γ2
t
}
.
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As in the proof of Proposition 2.1, after replacing a by 1 − γ, we see that
(29) holds if and only if
(1− γ)
(
r +
1
γ
θ>θ − µ1/γK−1/γ − 1
2γ
θ>θ
)
< ρ.
By (23), this condition is equivalent to
1− γ
γ
(
r − ρ
1− γ +
1
2γ
θ>θ + (1− µ)K−1
)
< 0.
This is true because K > (1−γ)n/m = (1−µ)/m, from previous comments.
 The Pareto strategy of the firm is the same as in the noncooperative
game, pi∗ = pic. In fact, it is the well known maximum portfolio growth
rule. Benefits are also proportional to wealth surplus, with a constant of
proportionality that now depends on the weight µ. It is worth noting that,
for µ = 1 (i.e., when the common objective is to maximize the union’s
payoff) we recover the MPNE. Hence, we have proved that the MPNE,
when α = β and γ = δ, is Pareto efficient. This is a remarkable result that
is really rare to find. The reason for having this property in the pension game
is that the aim of maximizing an increasing and concave utility function of
fund surplus is aligned with maximizing a utility from benefits collected
from the fund surplus. The larger the fund surplus, more ample possibilities
exist to collect more benefits. We establish this discussion in the following
proposition.
Proposition 2.3 The MPNE of the pension game (4), (6), (7), with α = β
and γ = δ is Pareto efficient.
Compared with the Pareto solutions for µ < 1, the MPNE over collect
benefits. This is a typical situation known as “the tragedy of the commons”:
in general, cooperation leads to less aggressive policies of the players that,
in this concrete model, allows a higher expected rate of growth of the fund
surplus, thereby allowing higher benefit levels to be collected. Note that for
α = β, γ = δ, µ < 1 and x > 0
P ∗(x) =
1− γ
γ
(
ρ
1− γ − r −
1
2γ
θ>θ
)
x
>
1− γ
γ
(
ρ
1− γ − r −
1
2γ
θ>θ − 1− µ
1− γK
−1
)
x = P c(x).
As a consequence, both players are better in the cooperative solution, as
we will prove below. The payoff of the union with Pareto strategies is
JU (x;P
c, pic) = Jµ=1(x;P
c, pic), which coincides with W (x) when µ = 1.
From (8) and (23), constantK for µ = 1 isK =
(
1−γ
γ
(
ρ
1−γ − r − θ
>θ
2γ
))−γ
=
15
A. Note that we are assuming α = β and γ = δ. Analogously, the payoff of
the firm with Pareto strategies is JF (x;P
c, pic) = Jµ=0(x;P
c, pic), which co-
incides with W (x) when µ = 0. From (9) and (23), the inverse of constant K
for µ = 0 is K−1 = (1−γ)
(
ρ
1−γ − r − θ
>θ
2γ
)
< ρ+ ργ − 1−γγ
(
r + θ
>θ
2γ
)
= B−1,
because 0 < γ < 1 and ρ > 0. Then we have proved:
JU (x;P
c, pic) = JU (x;P
∗, pi∗) = VU (x),
JF (x;P
c, pic) > JF (x;P
∗, pi∗) = VF (x).
Although superior in terms of outcome, Pareto strategies suffer from the
drawback of not being stable, since the union has incentives to deviate from
the Pareto solution—except when µ = 1 as said above—.
3 A pension game of minimizing the probability
of ruin
Undoubtedly, the firm’s objective of maximizing an increasing utility of the
fund surplus also cares about the health of the pension plan, but it is not the
only sensible way to model the aim of the firm of honoring the comprised
liabilities. Hence, let us study here a variant of the previous game. The ob-
jective of the union continues to be the same, as well as the dynamics. Only
the objective of the firm changes. We suppose that, instead of maximizing
the discounted expected utility of the fund surplus, it seeks to minimize the
probability of ruin. More precisely, the firm fixes two fund surplus levels,
` > 0 (for the lower level) and υ > ` (for the upper level) ,and starting the
funding process with X(0) = x ∈ (`, υ), wishes to maximize the probability
of reaching υ before `. Thus, ` is considered by the firm as a ruin point.
Thus, the objective is different from the one given in the pension game in
Section 2. There, the firm’s aim was to maximize the expected growth rate
of the pension fund, weighted by the risk aversion index of the firm. Here,
the firm is concerned not only with growth, but also with preventing that
the fund assets from reaching such a low level that is considered a ruin point.
In other words, the firm wants to minimize the probability that the fund
leaves the surplus region, so that solvency is guaranteed. Hence, the firm
sets a surplus level, still positive, but so small, that below this threshold
warning alarms are set off, as the insolvency region is close. The aim of the
firm is to minimize the probability of reaching this “ruin point”.
3.1 Players’ Payoffs
We first deal with the payoffs of the firm. Given P ∈ AU fixed, the firm
chooses pi ∈ AF to maximize the probability that the fund surplus reaches
υ before `, hence the payoff is
JF (x;P, pi) = P (Tυ < T`|X(0) = x) , ` < x < υ. (30)
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Here Tz denotes the first time that X hits the value z ≥ 0. If X(P,pi) is
the fund surplus under profile (P, pi) satisfying (4), then Tz = inf{t > 0 :
X(P,pi)(t) = z}. We can rewrite the payoff as
JF (x;P, pi) = Exh(X(P,pi)(T ))
with T = min{T`, Tυ)and h(`) = 0, h(υ) = 1.
The union’s payoff should be
JU (x;P, pi) = Ex
(∫ T
0
e−αtu(P (t))dt+ e−αT g(X(P,pi)(T ))
)
,
where g is a bequest function. These two functionals, together with the
evolution of X given in (4), specify the game. The game terminates at the
random time T . Stochastic optimal control problems of this type are usually
difficult to solve, explicitly or even numerically. Here, the problem seems
even harder since we are dealing with a game. The problem arises because
the value functions of the players satisfy a two-point boundary value system
of differential equations. The boundary conditions are
VU (`) = g(`), VU (υ) = g(υ),
VF (`) = 0, VF (υ) = 1.
The HJB system is3
αVU (x) = max
P
{
P 1−γ
1− γ +
(
rx+ pi>(b− r1)− P )V ′U (x)}+ 12pi>ΣpiV ′′U (x),
0 = max
pi
{(
rx+ pi>(b− r1)− P )V ′F (x) + 12pi>ΣpiV ′′F (x)
}
.
Note that the maximizers obey the same rule as in the previous game of
Section 2
P = (V ′U (x))
−1/γ , (31)
pi = −Σ−1(b− r1)V
′
F (x)
V ′′F (x)
. (32)
and substituting them into the system above, we get
αVU (x) =
γ
1− γ (V
′
U (x))
1−1/γ + rxV ′U (x)− θ>θ
V ′F (x)
V ′′F (x)
V ′U (x) +
1
2
θ>θ
(
V ′F (x)
V ′′F (x)
)2
V ′′U (x),
0 = rxV ′F (x)−
1
2
θ>θ
(V ′F (x))
2
V ′′F (x)
− (V ′U (x))−1/γV ′F (x).
(33)
3The stochastic control problems of Dirichlet type, as in the problem considered here,
have been analyzed with the dynamic programming approach in Krylov (1980). Gen-
eral results in the portfolio selection have been obtained in Browne (1997, 1999). Josa-
Fombellida and Rinco´n-Zapatero (2006) introduced and studied these types of problems
in pension funding.
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The boundary conditions are, as we said above,
VU (`) = g(`), VU (υ) = g(υ),
VF (`) = 0, VF (υ) = 1.
We have not been able to find an explicit solution to this problem, even
for simple selections of the bequest function g. Thus, we proceed to simplify
the game. We will solve instead a modified game, where the union acts
rather myopically, as if the planning horizon were not random, but fixed and
of infinite horizon. If the upper value υ is large, then the probability that
the process X will leave the interval (`, υ) by the upper boundary may be
made small. Moreover, as we will prove below, at the Nash equilibrium with
suitable assumptions concerning the game’s parameters, the lower boundary
` is never reached with positive probability. Thus, for large values of υ, to
approximate the union’s payoff with the expected utility on the interval
[0,∞) could be justified. Based on these considerations, we assume that the
union wishes to maximize
JU (x;P, pi) = Ex
∫ ∞
0
e−αtu(P (t))dt, (34)
as in the previous sections, and analyze the game as an approximation to
the true game, for which we do not know the solution. Now, the boundary
conditions for the value function VU does not apply and we can solve the
game explicitly. Then the boundary conditions that we impose are
lim
t→∞ e
−αtEx(VU (XP,pi(t))) = 0,
VF (`) = 0, VF (υ) = 1.
(35)
The first equality is the familiar transversality condition. The second set of
conditions establishes that the probability of reaching υ before reaching ` is
0 at x = ` and 1 at x = υ.
In the next proposition, we state the form of the MPNE of the pension
game to minimize the probability of ruin.
Proposition 3.1 Assume that α > r and
α− r <
(
γ2
2
− γ + 1
)
θ>θ. (36)
Then the value function of the union and the firm in the pension game (4),
(30), (34) are
VU (x) = D
x1−γ
1− γ , (37)
VF (x) =
x1−η− − `1−η−
υ1−η− − `1−η− , (38)
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respectively, where
D =
(
r +
1
2η−
θ>θ
)−γ
,
and
η− =
(1− γ2 )θ>θ −
√
∆
2(α− r) ,
with ∆ =
(
(1− γ2 )θ>θ
)2−2(α−r)γ(1−γ)θ>θ. The MPNE (P r, pir) is given
by
P r(x) = D−1/γx, (39)
pir(x) =
1
η−
Σ−1(b− r1)x (40)
and the equilibrium fund surplus is a geometric Brownian motion process,
dX∗(t) =
θ>θ
2η−
X∗(t)dt+
1
η−
θ>X∗(t) dw(t). (41)
Proof. To solve the HJB system (33) and initial data (35) above we try
solutions of the form VU (x) = D
x1−γ
1−γ and VF (x) =
x1−η−`1−η
υ1−η−`1−η , where the
constants D and η have to be determined. After plugging the guessed ex-
pressions for the value functions into the HJB system (33), we get that D
and η have to satisfy
α
1− γ =
γ
1− γD
−1/γ + r +
1
η
θ>θ − γ
2η2
θ>θ,
0 = r +
1
2η
θ>θ −D−1/γ .
Substituting D−1/γ from the second identity into the first equation we get
0 = (α− r)η2 − (1− γ
2
)θ>θη +
1
2
γ(1− γ)θ>θ, (42)
which admits the solutions η± given by η− = (1−
γ
2
)θ>θ−√∆
2(α−r) and η
+ =
(1− γ
2
)θ>θ+
√
∆
2(α−r) . Both are real, as the discriminant ∆ of the equation (42)
is positive under the assumptions of the proposition. Note that ∆ > 0 if
and only if α − r < h(γ)θ>θ, where h(γ) = (1−
γ
2
)2
2γ(1−γ) , for γ ∈ (0, 1). It is not
difficult to check that γ
2
2 −γ+1 < 1 < h(γ), for all γ ∈ (0, 1). Thus, (36) im-
plies ∆ > 0. Now we prove that 0 < η− < 1 < η+. If (1−γ/2)θ>θ > 2(α−r)
then η+ >
(1− γ
2
)θ>θ
2(α−r) > 1, because ∆ > 0, and if (1 − γ/2)θ>θ < 2(α − r)
then η+ > 1 if and only if
√
∆ > 2(α − r) − (1 − γ/2)θ>θ. Taking the
square we get (36). On the other hand, as
√
∆ < (1 − γ/2)θ>θ then
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η− > 0. To prove η− < 1, note that if (1 − γ/2)θ>θ < 2(α − r), then
(1−γ/2)θ>θ−√∆ < 2(α−r), that is, η− < 1. And if (1−γ/2)θ>θ > 2(α−r),
then η− < 1 if and only if
√
∆ > −2(α−r)+(1−γ/2)θ>θ. Taking the square
we get again (36). Thus η− is the unique root of (42) in (0, 1). The coeffi-
cient D is well defined and positive. Moreover, VU defined in (37) is strictly
convex and VF , defined in (38), is strictly concave, because 0 < η
− < 1.
Now, the equilibrium candidate (39) and (40) is obtained from the optimal-
ity conditions (31) and (32), once VU , VF are substituted. To see that the
pair (P r, pir) is indeed an MPNE, note that V ′′F < 0, because 0 < η
− < 1,
thus pir is a true maximizer of the HJB equation for the firm—it was al-
ready clear that P r was a maximizer of the HJB equation of the union—.
Upon substitution of (P r, pir) into the SDE (4), we get (41), thus (P r, pir) is
clearly an admissible pair of strategies. Finally, we prove that the transver-
sality condition (35) holds. See, as in the proofs of previous propositions,
Herna´ndez-Lerma (2004) Section 7, or Theorem 8.5 of Dockner et al (2000).
By Arnold (1974), p. 139, for any real number a,
Ex(X∗(t))a = xa exp
{
a
(
1
2η−
θ>θ − 1
2(η−)2
θ>θ
)
t+
a2
2
θ>θ
(η−)2
t
}
.
After replacing a by 1− γ, we see that (35) holds if and only if
(1− γ)
2(η−)2
θ>θ(η− − γ) < α.
This condition is equivalent to
1
2
θ>θη− + r(η−)2 > 0,
by (42). The left side, that coincides with (η−)2D−1/γ , is positive because
D > 0, 0 < η− < 1. 
Remark 3.1 When α− r = (γ22 − γ + 1)θ>θ, then the previous proposition
is true letting η− = 1 and VF (x) = lnx−ln `ln υ−ln ` .
As in the previous game, the equilibrium strategies P r and pir are pro-
portional to the surplus X. It is interesting to note that they do not depend
on ` or υ. We have carried out a sensitivity analysis, as in Section 2.3.1,
obtaining a similar response of the coefficient strategies to changes in the
parameters, so we do not report our findings here. What we will do instead
is a brief comparison of the equilibrium of the two games analyzed above,
which are shown in the table below.
In what follows, note that the constant η−, defined in Proposition 3.1,
depends on the characteristics of the financial market and on the risk atti-
tude of the union.
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Table 1: Equilibrium strategies
Game Investment Benefit
Maximizing utility pi∗(x) = 1δΣ
−1(b− r1)x P ∗(x) = A−1/γx
Minimizing probability of ruin pir(x) = 1η−Σ
−1(b− r1)x P r(x) = D−1/γx
• Investment is equal in both games if the risk aversion parameter of
the firm δ = η−. A higher (lower) risk aversion parameter δ leads to
a more (less) cautious investment strategy in the maximizing-utility-
game than in the minimizing-the-probability-of-ruin game.
• Benefits comparison is not so straightforward. The share claimed by
the union in the first scenario game is greater than in the second
scenario game if and only if
α > r +
(
(1− γ)
(
1
δ
− γ
2δ2
)
+
γ
2η−
)
θ>θ.
Since the r.h.s. tends to −∞ as δ → 0+, it is clear that the inequality
is fulfilled (the situation now is that the rest of the parameters are
fixed, and we look for values of the risk aversion parameter of the firm
that satisfy the inequality). It is not difficult to prove4 that δ = η−
is the threshold such that the inequality above is fulfilled if and only
if δ ∈ (0, η−). It is worth comparing P ∗ with P r. Since P ∗(x) is
a decreasing function of δ in (0, γ) and increasing in (γ, 1), it holds
that for δ = γ, P ∗(x) reaches its minimum value. Then, using (36),
we obtain P ∗(x) < P r(x) when δ → 1, and then P ∗(x) < P r(x) for
δ ∈ [γ, 1). This implies δ = η− ∈ (0, γ).
Summing up, both firms’ investment in risky assets and extra benefits
claimed by the union are smaller in the minimizing-the-probability-of-ruin
game than in the maximizing-utility-game when the risk aversion coefficient
of the firm is below η−. The situation is reversed for higher risk aversion co-
efficients. When δ = η−, both games share the same equilibrium strategies
of benefits and investment.
4Equating expressions for A and D, this is equivalent to
(α− r)(η−)2 − (1− γ
2
)θ>θη− +
1
2
γ(1− γ)θ>θ − γ
2η−
θ>θδ2 +
γ
2
θ>θδ = 0,
that is to say δ = η−, by (42).
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4 Conclusions
In the large body of literature about defined benefit pension plans, the in-
teraction between sponsor and participants has been considered as one of
a sole decision agent. The participants took a passive role. Our starting
point in this paper has been that, at least when the fund is overfunded, the
fund surplus could be given a strategic role by incrementing the benefits of
the participants at the time of retirement. We have proposed an asymmet-
ric noncooperative game in two different scenarios that allows for analytical
solutions and that could be easily implemented in real pension plans of de-
fined benefits type, since the Nash equilibrium is linear. We have shown that
players with the same relative risk aversion index will seek noncooperatively
a cooperative outcome, or in other words, the decentralized interaction gives
rise to an efficient split of the fund surplus. Moreover, if the sponsoring firm
is worried about the safety of the pension plan, this behavior corresponds
in equilibrium with a firm that wants to maximize its own discounted ex-
pected utility in the first scenario game. Further research will be directed
at analyzing hierarchical interaction between firm and participants, which is
an interesting situation if the two players have different negotiating power.
Here, the relevant solution concept is the Stackelberg equilibrium. It would
be worth comparing the Nash equilibrium with the Stackelberg equilibrium
to see to what extent the advantage of being the leader, which is a usual
property, is maintained in this case.
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